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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to qualify the claim that regulating a competitive
transport sector is always detrimental to consumers. We show indeed that, al-
though transport deregulation is beneﬁcial to consumers as long as the location of
economic activity is ﬁxed, this is no longer true when, in the long run, ﬁrms and
workers are freely mobile. The reason is that the static gains due to less monopoly
power in the transport sector may well map into dynamic dead-weight losses because
deregulation of the transport sector leads to more ineﬃcient agglomeration. This
latter change may, quite surprisingly, increase consumer prices in some regions, de-
spite a more competitive transport sector. Transport deregulation is shown to map
into aggregate consumer welfare losses and more inequality among consumers in the
long run.
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11 Introduction
In most countries, the transport sector was replete (and still is) with allocative distortions
of various types. Transport deregulation is expected to promote a better allocation of re-
sources through ﬁercer competition between carriers and, therefore, lower freight rates
and consumer prices. This is why, in the wake of the Motor Carrier Act and the Stagger
Act of 1980, the trucking and the rail industries have been deregulated in the US to pro-
mote a more ﬂexible and competitive environment (see Winston, 1993, for an overview).
As pointed out by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001), this has been, in recent years, a general
tendency among OECD countries where greater competition between road haulers has
been promoted. More competition in the transport sector is also an objective ranking
high on the European Union’s (henceforth, EU) agenda, especially for the rail freight
industry (European Commission, 2001).
Because deregulation is widely met with public scepticism in the EU, a thorough
assessment of the possible welfare and distributional impacts of such policies is important.
Yet, it is well known that for such an assessment to be halfway accurate, it should take
into account most of the indirect eﬀects that regulation might have:
“The central methodological lesson from assessments appears to be that their ac-
curacy is highly dependent on their completeness. That is, a good assessment must
take into account all variables that have been inﬂuenced by deregulation.” (Win-
ston, 1993, p.1283)
While several studies take into account the eﬀects deregulation may have on market struc-
ture, ﬁrms’ structure, technological change, and organization, it is surprising that, to the
best of our knowledge, no study has investigated the eﬃciency of transport deregulation
by taking into account its spatial impacts, at least at the interregional level. While such
a neglect may not be a serious issue in, for example, the banking and ﬁnancial sector
or the distribution of electricity and gas, it is unlikely to be so in the transport sector.
The reason is that transport costs are key determinants of the spatial organization of
the economy as manufacturing ﬁrms’ locational decisions are based on the accessibility
to output and input markets (Beckmann and Thisse, 1986; Fujita et al., 1999). This
observation has a major implication that has been very much overlooked in the literature
until now: transport pricing and regulatory reforms in the transport sector aﬀect not just
consumer prices and the volume of commodity ﬂows across regions, but also the location
2of industry.1 Since the location of economic activity has important distributional and
overall welfare implications (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2002; Charlot et al., 2006), analyses
of the potential beneﬁts of transport deregulation that hold the spatial distribution of
activity ﬁxed may be misleading. This is even more so for integrating blocks that have
committed themselves to a regional cohesion objective, as is the case of the EU under the
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.
The purpose of this paper is to study how the deregulation of the transport sector
aﬀects social welfare once it is recognized that ﬁrms and mobile agents are free to relocate
in the long-run in response to permanent changes in freight rates and consumer prices.
Our key result is to show that there is a trade-oﬀ between short run beneﬁts and long run
losses: in the short run, transport deregulation reduces static dead-weight losses arising
from market power in both the transport and the manufacturing sector; but, in the long
run, it generates dead-weight losses because of a sub-optimal redistribution of industrial
activity across regions. In order to investigate in depth these short and long-run con-
sequences of transport deregulation in a spatial economy, we must identify, on the one
hand, the microeconomic underpinnings of the pricing of transport services and, on the
other hand, the manufacturing ﬁrms’ reactions to the strategies selected by the carriers.
This will be done within a modeling framework combining: (i) an imperfectly competi-
tive transport sector in which freight rates are determined through strategic interactions
between carriers, and (ii) a model of location and trade that allows for a detailed descrip-
tion of the pricing and locational choices made by the manufacturing ﬁrms in response
to carriers’ pricing policies. By focussing on the interaction between the transport and
the manufacturing sectors, we provide a new and richer description of the corresponding
market structure: the demand for transport services depends on the spatial distribution
of the manufacturing sector, which itself varies with the degree of competition between
carriers through the level of freight rates. Such a nested market structure may then be
used to study how deregulating the transport sector aﬀects the well-being of economic
agents, especially consumers and carriers. It is worth emphasizing that our approach has
a broader scope than standard cost-beneﬁt analyses used in transport economics in that
1Even though freight rates have dramatically declined since the Industrial Revolution, they still repre-
sent a signiﬁcant fraction of the costs that ﬁrms must bear when shipping goods across regions or countries
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Combes and Lafourcade, 2005). This is why we may safely conclude
that the geographical organization of the economy remains, to a large extent, shaped by the transport
sector and by infrastructure, especially at the subnational level. Teixeira (2006) has, for example, shown
by means of a structural econometric approach that better transport infrastructure in Portugal has indeed
resulted in more spatial inequality across regions.
3we consider the impact of transport deregulation not only upon commodity ﬂows but upon
wage rates as well. This point is important because deregulation and antitrust policies
tend to focus on consumers’ surplus gains, neglecting too often possible losses on labor
markets.
Our ﬁrst result is in line with standard analysis. We show that, even thought wages fall,
consumers always beneﬁt from deregulation as long as the location of economic activity
remains unchanged. The reason is that deregulation reduces freight rates and maps into
lower consumer prices. This ﬁnding agrees with Morrison and Winston (1999) for whom
a conservative estimate of the annual beneﬁt that American consumers have reaped from
intercity transport deregulation amounts approximately to $50 billion. Our remaining
results reveal some unsuspected long-run implications of deregulation. Interestingly, they
are all related to the spatial organization of the economy. First, we show that the demand
for transport services depends on the spatial distribution of the manufacturing sector.
Quite surprisingly, this demand becomes less elastic as the degree of spatial agglomeration
rises, which increases carriers’ market power and allows them to charge higher markups.
Given constant marginal cost in the transport sector, freight rates unambiguously rise with
the degree of spatial concentration of production.2 Second, and as a direct consequence of
the previous result, we show that the economy becomes gradually more agglomerated as
the number of carriers increases, as the marginal cost in the transport sector falls, or both.
T h er e a s o ni st h a tm a r k e tp o w e ri nt h et r a n s p o r ts e c t o ri m p l i e st h a tm o r ea g g l o m e r a t i o n
raises shipping costs for manufactured goods, thereby reducing the agglomeration forces.
In other words, the agglomeration process is self-defeating. This trade-oﬀ between a better
allocation of resources in the short run and a growing agglomeration of the manufacturing
sector in the long run suggests a role for regulators that has not been often considered
so far. Last, we show that the welfare impacts of transport deregulation are opposite,
both with respect to consumers’ welfare and carriers’ aggregate proﬁts. Indeed, once the
dependency of the spatial distribution on the competitive environment in the transport
sector is taken into account, deregulation leads to (i) aggregate consumer welfare losses3
2There is some evidence that the spatial structure of freight rates has been aﬀected by deregulation.
For example, Blair et al. (1986) show that trucking rates fell more in large markets than in small markets
in the wake of complete trucking deregulation in Florida. Levin (1981) and Winston (1993) argue that
deregulation led to a reshuﬄing in prices aﬀecting various consumer groups and markets diﬀerently,
especially in the presence of initial cross-subsidization.
3There is no clear evidence from rigorous econometric studies that deregulation has induced lower
freight rates. On the one hand, Rose (1985) concludes that US trucking deregulation has elimated a
fraction of rents earned by carriers under regulation. Blair et al. (1986) estimate that the deregulation of
4but (ii) higher aggregate proﬁts in the transport sector.4 Hence, we uncover a new and
important trade-oﬀ for policy markers and antitrust authorities: if, in the short run,
deregulating the transport sector is beneﬁcial to consumers, the reverse holds true in the
long run.5 Although our approach diﬀers from Baumol and Willig (1998), we may also
conclude that there is a need for defensive regulatory rules in transport markets.
Before proceeding, a ﬁnal comment is in order. Ever since the pioneering work of
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), we know that when at least one optimality condition is
not satisﬁed, for whatever reason, the other optimality conditions no longer hold. Con-
sequently, implementing a ﬁr s t - b e s tp o l i c yo no n em a r k e tm a yn o tb es o c i a l l yd e s i r a b l e
when the other markets are not competitive. Yet, it is not easy to cook up examples in
which a move toward the competitive solution makes the whole economy worse oﬀ.O u r
analysis oﬀers such an example in the sense that a more competitive transport sector
appears to be detrimental to consumers in the long run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model as well as some preliminary results. The market outcome for the transport sector
is analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, we show how the degree of competition in the
transport sector aﬀects the location of the manufacturing sector and the volume of trade.
Section 5 provides a welfare analysis of the transport deregulation, whereas Section 6
concludes.
intrastate trucking in Florida has led to an average reduction of 14.62% in carriers’ rates. On the other
hand, using simulations, Levin (1981) has shown that, for most plausible scenarios, average rail rates
would increase under deregulation. Boyer (1987) found that the most likely eﬀect of deregulation has
been to increase rail rates by about 2%, while McFarland (1989) suggests that deregulation had no eﬀect
on railraod rates. We are not aware of studies estimating the impact of deregulation on consumer prices.
4Winston (1993) also provides evidence that suggests that railroad carriers may have actually gained
from deregulation. Indeed, deregulation “has also produced some unexpected price diﬀerences [...].I n
particular, the concentration of airline competition at hub airports and of interexchange telecommunica-
tions competition for big users, and the greater freedom of railroads to charge bulk commodity shippers
what the traﬃc will bear has increased genuine price discrimination” (Winston, 1993, p.1276).
5This result bears some resemblance with what Norman and Thisse (2000) observe in a very diﬀerent
context: policies that create too though a competitive environment may eventually end up being detri-
mental to consumers. It should also be noted that Hurley (1994) has shown that forcing a carrier to
price a captive shipper at marginal cost would not enhance eﬃciency when shippers and carriers are in
a vertical relationship.
52T h e m o d e l
It should be clear from the foregoing that we need a setting in which the impact of
freight rates on the location of economic activity may be analyzed. This is precisely what
economic geography aims at achieving (Fujita et al., 1999; Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
Ever since the pioneering contribution of Krugman (1991), the typical thought experiment
of economic geography is to ﬁgure out how changing transport costs aﬀects the location of
ﬁrms and workers. It seems, therefore, natural to include an economic geography model
within our framework. Speciﬁcally, we will use the linear model proposed by Ottaviano
et al. (2002) because it captures directly the impact that the level of freight rates has
on manufacturing ﬁrms’ pricing strategies. It is also analytically solvable, which makes it
especially well suited as a building-block of a broader model such as ours.
The economy consists of two regions, labeled r or s = H,F. Variables associated with
each region will be subscripted accordingly. There are two production factors, skilled
and unskilled labor. We denote by L the total mass of skilled and by A the total mass
of unskilled workers in the economy. Each individual works and consumes in the region
she lives in. While the unskilled are immobile and their interregional distribution is
exogenously given, skilled workers are mobile and their spatial distribution is endogenously
determined. In order to control for any exogenous size advantage, we assume that the
unskilled are evenly spread across the two regions, each of which hosts a mass A/2 of them.
Let 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 stand for the share of skilled workers living in region H. Without loss
of generality, we may then restrict ourselves to the domain λ ≥ 1/2, i.e., agglomeration
takes place in region H.
In order to disentangle the various eﬀects at work, it is both relevant and convenient
to distinguish between what we call a short-run equilibrium, in which skilled workers are
supposed to be immobile, i.e. λ is exogenous; and a long-run equilibrium when they are
mobile, i.e. λ is endogenous.
2.1 Preferences
All workers have the same quasi-linear utility with respect to a homogeneous good and
a continuum of horizontally diﬀerentiated varieties of mass n ≡ nH + nF. For reasons
that will be made clear below, the homogeneous good is chosen as the numéraire. The
utility is quasi-linear and the subutility over the varieties is quadratic. All workers are
endowed with one unit of their labor type (skilled or unskilled) and q0 > 0 units of the
6numéraire. The initial endowment q0 is supposed to be large enough for the consumption
of the numéraire to be strictly positive at the market outcome, which eliminates the



































pir(v)qir(v)dv + q0 = yr + q0
where α > 0, β > γ > 0 are parameters (the condition β > γ implies that consumers
have a preference for variety); qir(v) and pir(v) are the quantity and the consumer price
of variety v in region r when it is produced in region i;a n dyr is the resident’s income,
which depends on her skilled or unskilled status.
Solving the consumption problem yields the following demand functions:
qsr(v)=a − (b + cn)psr(v)+cPr s,r = H,F (1)









is the price index (i.e., the average price) of all varieties sold in region r = H,F.
2.2 The consumption goods sectors
There are two sectors producing consumption goods. The traditional sector supplies the
homogeneous good under perfect competition using unskilled labor as the only input of
a constant-returns technology. The unit input requirement is set to one by choice of
units. In the manufacturing sector, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms oﬀer a continuum
of varieties of a horizontally diﬀerentiated good employing both factors under increasing
returns to scale. Speciﬁcally, we assume that ﬁrms face a ﬁxed requirement of φ > 0 units
of skilled labor, whereas their marginal unskilled labor requirement is constant and set
equal to zero without loss of generality.6 Given the foregoing assumptions, skilled labor








6When the marginal requirement m is strictly positive, what follows continues to hold true provided
that α is replaced by α − m in the demand functions (Ottaviano et al., 2002).
7Shipping the homogeneous good is assumed to be costless, thus implying that its price
is equalized across regions. This explains why that good is the natural choice for the
numéraire. Consequently, in equilibrium the unskilled wage is equal to one in each re-
gion. By contrast, shipping the diﬀerentiated varieties is costly. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms have
to pay a freight rate of t>0 units of the numéraire per unit of any variety transported
between the two regions. Because there is a continuum of ﬁrms, each one is negligible
to the economy. It may thus accurately treat t as a parameter. Note, however, that this
rate will be endogenously determined in a game involving imperfectly competitive carri-
ers, whereas it is considered as exogenous in standard economic geography and location
models. Furthermore, the existence of transport costs in the manufacturing sector implies
that trade no longer leads to the equalization of skilled wages between regions; they are
also endogenous in our setting.
We also assume that product markets are segmented and that labor markets are local.
The ﬁrst assumption means that each ﬁrm is free to price discriminate and to set a price
speciﬁc to the region in which it sells its output (Engel and Rogers, 1996; Wolf, 2000;
Haskel and Wolf, 2001). The second assumption means that no interregional commuting
takes place so that workers are employed only in their region of residence. For skilled
workers this implies that their wages may diﬀer across regions; we denote by wr the
skilled wage rate prevailing in region r. As markets are segmented, a ﬁrm located in














where prs is the producer price of a variety produced in region r and sold in s 6= r.
Because skilled workers are geographically mobile, aggregate regional incomes depend on
their spatial distribution. Throughout the paper, we focus on the meaningful case in
which the freight rate t is suﬃciently low for interregional trade to be bilateral, regardless
of the ﬁrm distribution λ.
2.3 The transport sector
There are m carriers that supply non-cooperatively a homogeneous transport service.
They all have access to the same constant returns technology, which requires only unskilled
labor as input. More precisely, shipping one unit of the diﬀerentiated product between H
and F requires τ > 0 units of unskilled labor, thus implying that τ is also the marginal
production cost of a carrier with respect to the volume of hauling. The transport sector
8being a priori competitive, deregulation should be especially eﬃcient because of the well-
known ‘ineﬃciencies of regulating a competitive industry’.7 Finally, we assume that the
number m of carriers prior to deregulation is small due to entry regulations.8
Let qk stand for the supply of transport service by carrier k =1 ,2,...,m. The proﬁt
of carrier k is then given by
Π
T
k =( t − τ)qk. (3)
3 Prices, wages, and freight rates
Formally, the short-run equilibrium is described by a sequential game, the carriers being
the leaders and the manufacturing ﬁrms the followers. Such a division of roles reﬂects
the structuring power that the transport sector has on the spatial distribution of the
manufacturing sector. In the ﬁrst stage, carriers choose the quantities of transport service
they supply, whereas manufacturing ﬁrms choose their prices in the second stage of the
game, taking the freight rate as given. In other words, when choosing how much service
to supply, carriers anticipate the consequences of their strategies on the volume of trade
between the two regions. However, carriers do not account for the impact that they
have on the spatial distribution of the manufacturing sector. Handling such an eﬀect is
formally involved and not necessarily empirically meaningful. Indeed, if ﬁrms are likely
to be able to anticipate what happens in their own market, they probably do not realize
that changing their freight rates may have an inﬂuence on the spatial structure of the
economy or, if they do, they do not have the ability to tackle that problem.
7Yet, deregulation per se is not necessarily beneﬁcial in industries that involves a small number
of producers (see, e.g., Levin, 1981, who argues that deregulation in rail transportation may not be
beneﬁcial). The reason is that market power may be large enough to trigger structural changes, which
generates pure proﬁts, high prices, and static dead-weight losses after deregulation.
8This assumption describes fairly well the trucking industry before deregulation, in which scale
economies appear to be relatively small (Ying, 1990). For example, Blair et al. (1986, p.160) sum-
marize the regulations in Florida’s trucking industry prior to deregulation as follows: “First, prices (or
price schedules) were determined by the intrastate bureaus with review and approval of the resulting rate
submissions by the Public Service Commission. Second, entry into the regulated sector of the trucking
industry was strictly controlled by the Public Service Commission. Third, various operating restrictions
were imposed that limited geographic areas served, backhauls, types of vehicles used, types of commodi-
ties carried, and so on. Finally, the common carrier obligation required a trucker to provide service to
all customers willing to pay the approved rate even if this required serving unproﬁtable small markets.”
93.1 Prices and wages











s 6= r. (5)
Expressions (4)—(5) show that the price a ﬁrm sets in region r depends on the price index
Pr of this region, which depends itself on the prices set by all other ﬁrms. Because each
ﬁrm is negligible to the market, it chooses its optimal price by taking aggregate market
conditions and wages as given. At the same time, aggregate market conditions must
be consistent with ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decisions. Hence, the (Nash) equilibrium price
index P∗








Under the assumption of bilateral trade between regions, the equilibrium price indices
can be found by solving (6) for P∗














Substituting the equilibrium prices (4) and the price index (2) into the demands (1), the




















=( b + cn)(p
∗
sr − t). (9)
Thus, a higher freight rate raises the demand for each local variety at the expense of
imported varieties. In other words, carriers’ pricing decisions have a direct impact on trade
patterns, yet this substitution eﬀect decreases when varieties becomes more diﬀerentiated
(i.e., when c decreases).
10We are now equipped to determine the conditions on t for trade to occur between the
two regions at the equilibrium prices (q∗
sr > 0 or, equivalently, p∗










must hold for both interregional demands to be positive. Because equilibrium prices
depend on the ﬁrm distribution, the occurrence of interregional trade also depends on the
spatial distribution of the industry. The most stringent condition on t is obtained when
λ =1 , since when all ﬁrms are agglomerated the larger market is more competitive and,





which we assume to hold throughout the paper.9
Turning to the labor market, the equilibrium wages of the skilled are such that all
operating proﬁts are absorbed by the wage bill, i.e. Πr(w∗
r)=0 . Stated diﬀerently, ﬁrms
b i du pw a g e sf o rw o r k e r su n t i ln oﬁrm can proﬁtably enter in or exit from the market.
Substituting the equilibrium prices, as well as the equilibrium quantities (8)—(9) into the




























The demand for transport services is given by the aggregate volume of trade between the
two regions evaluated at the equilibrium prices (7).10 Some straightforward calculations


















= ρ0 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)η − [ρ1 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)]t. (11)







ρ1 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)t
ρ0 − ρ1 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)(η − t)
(12)
9To improve readability, we single out some conditions involving structural parameters by indexing
the equation numbers with ‘C’.
10In the literature on general equilibrium with oligopolistic competition (Bonanno, 1990), this means
that we consider a Cournot-Chamberlin equilibrium instead of the standard Cournot-Walras equilibrium
in which the outcome of the second stage is described by a Walrasian equilibrium. When locations are
exogenous, the function Q is then the so-called ‘objective’ demand of the carriers.
11where ρ0, ρ1, ρ2 and η are strictly positive bundles of parameters deﬁned in Appendix A.1.
and satisfying the inequality
ρ0 − ηρ1 > 0.
Hence, for a given ﬁrm distribution, the demand for transport services is a linear and
downward sloping function of the freight rate. A suﬃcient condition for Q>0 for all λ is
that all interregional demands are positive, which holds true as long as (C1) is satisﬁed.
Note furthermore that η <t trade when A>L .11
Insert Figure 1 about here
It is worth noting that both the intercept and the absolute value of the slope decrease
with λ over the interval [1/2,1] (see Figure 1). Put diﬀerently, the transport demand varies
in complex ways with the spatial distribution of ﬁrms. In particular, Q is not monotone
in the degree of spatial concentration. Indeed, for a given value of t,i ti n c r e a s e si nλ
when t>η and decreases otherwise. This is because two opposite eﬀects are at work.
First, when region H hosts an increasing share of ﬁrms and skilled workers, the quantities
imported of each variety produced in the other region (q∗
FH)a n dt h en u m b e ro fi m p o r t e d
varieties (nF) both shrink, which tends to reduce the volume of trade. Second, more
agglomeration in region H increases the quantities exported of each variety produced in
region H (q∗
HF) as well as the number of exported varieties (nH), which tends to increase
trade.
Yet, the transport demand function displays an important property with respect to λ.




−(2λ − 1)(ρ0 − ηρ1)tρ2
Q2 < 0 (13)
which implies that the price-elasticity ε of transport demand falls as the degree of spatial
concentration of the manufacturing sector rises. This turns out to be the unambiguous
outcome of two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, more agglomeration decreases the
intercept of the demand for transport services, thus raising the price-elasticity; on the
other hand, the demand gets less steep, thereby lowering the price-elasticity. As the
latter eﬀect always dominates the former, the price elasticity falls when λ increases.
11In Section 4, we will impose some further restrictions that require A to be suﬃciently large. In
particular, τ < η is required for the equilibrium freight rates to fall with the number of carriers m,w h i c h
i st h ec a s ew h e nA exceeds some threshold. The choice of this parameter being free, we will assume that
A exceeds the largest threshold. Such a condition reﬂects the idea that immobile activity represent the
larger share of the economy.
12We may now describe the game played by the carriers. First, the inverse demand for
transport services is readily obtained as follows:
t(Q)=
ρ0 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)η
ρ1 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)
−
Q
ρ1 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)
. (14)
The market clearing condition in the transport sector being
P
k qk = Q,t h ep r o ﬁto f
carrier k is given by
Π
T
k(qk,q−k)=[ t(Q) − τ]qk
where q−k is the vector of strategies chosen by the carriers other than k.A st h ei n v e r s e
demand (14) is linear, this game has a single Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. For any
given λ, the equilibrium price t∗ of the Cournot game satisﬁes the following well-known






Using (12), this yields a unique and symmetric solution given by
t
∗(λ)=τ +
ρ0 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)η − [ρ1 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)]τ
(m +1 )[ ρ1 + ρ2λ(1 − λ)]
. (15)
The ﬁrst term in (15) is the carrier’s marginal cost, and the second the carrier’s markup.
In Appendix B, we show that a suﬃcient conditions for the markup to be positive and
the trade condition (C1) to jointly hold, regardless of the spatial distribution λ,i sg i v e n
by
τ ≤ τtrade(m) ≡
a(2bm − cn)
bm(2b + cn)
which we assume to hold in what follows.







m[ε(λ,t ∗)]2 > 0
by condition (13), the equilibrium freight rate increases in λ over [1/2,1].T h er e a s o ni s
that more concentration of ﬁrms in region H makes the transport demand more inelastic,
thus endowing the carriers with more market power, which in turn allows them to charge
higher freight rates. Consequently, given the number of carriers, the equilibrium freight
rate is maximum when the manufacturing sector is agglomerated in region H (λ =1 ),
and minimum when this sector is evenly dispersed between the two regions (λ =1 /2).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium freight rate increases with the degree of spatial concen-
tration of the manufacturing sector.
13The following comments are in order. First, Proposition 1 suggests that it may be
important to explicitly account for the transport sector in economic geography and loca-
tion models. These models typically assume that transport costs are exogenously given
and they study the impact of decreases in these costs on the agglomeration process.12 We
will show in the following sections that such a neglect has indeed important consequences
when studying the impact of transport deregulation on industry location and welfare.
Second, as can be seen from (C3), τtrade(m) is increasing in m which shows that the
restrictions on carriers’ marginal cost gets less stringent as the number of carriers increases.
The reason is that more competition in the transport sector leads to lower freight rates
(provided the location of manufacturing ﬁrms is ﬁxed), which hence favors the occurrence
of interregional trade by increasing manufacturing ﬁrms’ ability to penetrate the foreign
market.
Third, as expected, for any given ﬁrm distribution λ, the equilibrium markup rate
decreases with the number of carriers because competition is ﬁercer. Furthermore, t∗(λ) →
τ as m →∞ , thus showing that marginal cost pricing prevails when the number of carriers
gets arbitrarily large. Because τtrade(m) → ttrade when m →∞ , the economic geography
model with an exogenous freight rate, such as Ottaviano et al. (2002), may then be viewed
as a limit case in which transportation is undertaken by a perfectly competitive (and fully
deregulated) sector.
Last, when τ is large, the trade condition may be violated since the freight rates
charged by the carriers are prohibitive. This is more likely is to occur when the number of
carriers is small, when goods are little diﬀerentiated, or both. In particular, it follows from
(C3) that m>c n / (2b) must hold for interregional trade to occur. The interpretation of
this condition is straightforward. When the manufacturing sector is very competitive (c
or n is large) whereas the transport sector is not (m is small), an increase in freight rates
makes the penetration of foreign markets almost impossible for exporters because local
competition is too ﬁerce.13 At the same time, carriers must set a non-negative markup
to break even. When τ is large compared to the preference for the diﬀerentiated good
(captured by a), or when the diﬀerentiated goods market is very competitive, the demand
for transportation services is small. In that case, carriers do not succeed to break even:
12Behrens and Gaigné (2006) analyze the agglomeration process when trade costs vary with the volume
of haul (density economies). However, they do not explicitly model the formation of freight rates.
13Levin (1981, p 3) points out that “product market or “source” competition among shippers may
constrain [them] from raising the rates of [their] “captive shippers” for fear of pricing them out of the
product market.”
14on the one hand, they must set a freight rate larger than or equal to their marginal
cost; on the other hand, there is no interregional trade at such a freight rate. In this
case, the carriers set the lowest possible freight rate compatible with zero interregional
trade, which is their proﬁt-maximizing (loss-minimizing) strategy. Note that, in that case,
transportation and trade between regions becomes asymmetric in the sense that only ﬁrms
located in one of the two regions may export their variety at the prevailing freight rate,
whereas those located in the other serve only their local market.14
For a given ﬁrm distribution, the short-run market equilibrium is deﬁned by (7), (10)
and (15). As discussed above, it may be viewed as an equilibrium in which agents’
locations are ﬁxed.
4 Transport deregulation and industry location
Deregulating a sector is expected to yield lower prices through either a large number
of competitors (e.g., by removing legal entry barriers), or lower costs (e.g., by using
more eﬃcient technologies), or both. In what follows, to study the impact of transport
deregulation, we choose a simple approach that involves a comparative static analysis on
the parameters m and τ.15 When the distribution of activity is ﬁxed, in a setting àl a
C o u r n o ts u c ha so u r si n c r e a s i n gm or decreasing τ l e a d st ol o w e rf r e i g h tr a t e s ,w h i c hi s
precisely the eﬀect we want to apprehend. Hence, both have the same qualitative impact
on the manufacturing sector, so that we may restrict ourselves to changes in m only.16
In this section, we study the location of ﬁrms and workers, i.e. the equilibrium value
of λ. As in most economic geography models (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999),
14See, for example, Behrens (2005) for a more detailed analysis of asymmetric trade patterns in a
similar modeling framework.
15Empirical evidence regarding those two objectives may be found in Morrison and Winston (1999)
who study the deregulation of U.S. intercity transportation. The deregulation of the transport sector
has mainly consisted in (i) fostering entry into that industry, i.e., to increase m; and (ii) technological
innovations, which lower production costs, i.e., decrease τ. Transport deregulation, in particular, has
“made entry much easier, as the burden of proof was shifted to opponents of entry to show that entry
was harmful to consumers” (Bailey, 1985, pp.3-4). A third objective in the U.S. was also to lower wages
because they signiﬁcantly exceeded the competitive level, especially since “the Teamster Union seemed to
exploit [...] monopoly power from truck regulation to extract some monopoly rents for organized labor”
(Ying and Keeler, 1991, pp.264-265).
16Note that cost reductions due to technological innovations always generate a welfare gain. However,
it has been argued both in the U.S. and the EU that much of the cost saving that has led to reduced
rates is due to lower pays to labor (Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer, 1998; Combes and Lafourcade, 2005).
15ﬁrms move together with their workers. Thus, to determine the long-run equilibrium
of the manufacturing sector, it is suﬃcient to study the migration of skilled workers.
These workers migrate to the region oﬀering them the higher utility level evaluated at the
equilibrium prices (4) and at the equilibrium wages (10).
As shown by Ottaviano et al. (2002), the welfare of a consumer/worker living in
region r is given by the sum of her consumer surplus, generated by the consumption of
the diﬀerentiated good, her wage, and her consumption of the homogenous good, each






































is the consumer surplus evaluated at the equilibrium prices. Because (16) holds whatever











Thus, a spatial equilibrium arises at: (i) λ
∗ ∈ [1/2,1] when ∆V ∗(λ
∗)=0 ; or (ii) at λ
∗ =1
if ∆V ∗(1) ≥ 0. Such an equilibrium always exists because V ∗
r is a continuous function of λ.
An interior equilibrium is stable if and only if the slope of the indirect utility diﬀerential
(18) is negative in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, i.e., ∂(∆V ∗)/∂λ < 0 at λ = λ
∗,
whereas an agglomerated equilibrium is stable whenever it exists.
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ε2 ≡ 4a(3b +2 cn)φ > 0
17Note that the initial endowment is fully reﬂected in the indirect utility, since its consumption yields
at least a utility of q0. Yet, changes in t change the consumption of the numéraire good, which is given




sr for the unskilled and by w∗




sr for the skilled,
respectively.
16are strictly positive bundles of parameters. It is easy to check that
ε2 − ηε1 > 0 (C4)
a condition that will be useful in the subsequent welfare analysis of Section 5. We now
discuss the diﬀerent types of spatial equilibria that may arise in our model.
(i) Agglomeration λ



















The threshold τs(m) is called the sustain point by analogy with the terminology used
in standard economic geography models. Observe that, for both the agglomerated and
dispersed conﬁgurations to arise as a spatial equilibrium when transport and/or trade
costs vary, it must be that τs(m) < τtrade(m). Indeed, when τs(m) > τtrade(m),t h e r ei s
always agglomeration under bilateral trade, which arises when A is suﬃciently small. By
contrast, τs(m) < τtrade(m) when the mass A of unskilled workers exceeds some threshold
value, which itself exceeds L. Under this condition, it can be shown that ∂τs(m)/∂m>0.
Hence, agglomeration is more likely to be a spatial equilibrium when the transport sector
is very competitive (m is large).
(ii) Dispersion λ
∗ =1 /2 is a stable equilibrium if and only if ∂∆V ∗(λ)/∂λ < 0 evalu-
ated at λ
∗ =1 /2, which yields the condition
t
∗(1/2) =
4(ρ0 − τρ1)+ρ2(η − τ)














The threshold τb(m) is called the break point. As in the foregoing, τb(m) < τtrade(m)
implies that ∂τb(m)/∂m>0, which again holds when A is suﬃciently large. Consequently,
dispersion is more likely to occur when the transport sector is little competitive (m is small).







which implies that (i) the spatial equilibrium is always unique and (ii) there exists a range
of τ-values for which stable partially agglomerated equilibria arise. This is because the
gradual concentration of the manufacturing sector in one region leads to an increase of the
equilibrium freight rate by making the transport demand more inelastic, thus slowing down
17the agglomeration process. The range shrinks with the number of carriers. It is worth
stressing that the sustain point and the break point are identical when the transport sector
is perfectly competitive (m →∞ ). In addition, τb(∞)=τs(∞) is equivalent to the limit
value of transport costs above which dispersion is a spatial equilibrium and below which
agglomeration prevails, as in Ottaviano et al. (2002).
(iii) Partial agglomeration As seen in the foregoing, the economy may also involve
partial agglomeration of the manufacturing sector (1/2 < λ
∗ < 1). We show that this
occurs when τb(m) > τ > τs(m). It is obtained by solving the equation −ε1t∗(λ)+ε2 =0 ,
which is quadratic in λ with two solutions symmetric about 1/2. The equilibrium value












where ΛA and ΛB are bundles of parameters deﬁned in Appendix A.2.
It is readily veriﬁed that λ
∗ < 1 when τ > τs(m) and that λ
∗ > 1/2 when τ < τb(m).18
Therefore, 1/2 < λ






2(m +1 ) ε2
1(ρ0 − ηρ1)
which, under condition (C2), implies that the foregoing equilibrium is stable as long as














4ε1(ρ0 − ηρ1)(ε2 − ε1τ)
ρ2[(m +1 ) ε2 − ε1(η + mτ)]2 > 0
where the inequality comes from (C2). It follows from the fact that ﬁrms price above







Hence, as the number of carriers rises, the economy moves gradually from dispersion
to agglomeration. Indeed, when some ﬁrms leave region F, say, toward region H,t h e
equilibrium freight rate increases so that ﬁrms located in region F have an incentive
to stay put because this allows them to relax price competition and to beneﬁtf r o m
high demand levels in this region. Consequently, changes in the spatial organization of
the economy are no longer catastrophic because agglomeration forces now are partially
18Note that ΛB(τ) > 0 if and only if τ > τs(m),w h i l eΛA(τ) > 0 if and only if τ < τb(m).
18balanced by additional dispersion forces arising from the price setting in the transport
sector. In other words, agglomeration becomes self-defeating, which stabilizes the spatial
distribution of ﬁrms. It is worth pointing out that such equilibria never arise in economic
geography models with exogenous freight rates (Krugman, 1991; Ottaviano et al., 2002).
Furthermore, when the technology in transportation allows for very low marginal costs,
we fall back on the standard result involving full agglomeration. Likewise, an increase in
the number of carriers implies more agglomeration because competition in the transport
sector is ﬁercer, hence facilitating the penetration of the smaller region from the larger
one.
Accordingly, we have:
Proposition 2 When the number of carriers increases, the spatial equilibrium gradually
moves from dispersion to agglomeration of the manufacturing sector.
Figure 2 depicts the spatial distribution of the manufacturing sector as the number of
carriers m rises.
Insert Figure 2 about here
5 Should the transport sector be deregulated?
In what follows, we ask whether or not a larger number of carriers is desirable from the
consumers’ and the carriers’ point of view.
As individual utilities are quasi-linear and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are zero, aggregate consumer
























∗(λ)) + 2] + (A + L)q0. (21)
As discussed in the introduction, two cases must be distinguished when assessing the
welfare impacts of transport deregulation. In the ﬁrst one, agents’ locations are considered
as ﬁxed. In the second case, ﬁrms and workers are mobile and free to adjust location in
response to changes in the level of freight rates. Those cases are considered in the next
two subsections. In a third subsection, we also analyze the changes in carriers’ proﬁts in
response to transport deregulation.
195.1 Exogenous industry distribution
Most economists and policy makers expect that transport deregulation will decrease com-
modities prices because ﬁrms’ pay lower freight rates and because spatial price competition




















by using (2) and (7). Hence, when mobile factors do not relocate in response to changing
freight rates, more competition in the transport sector unambiguously lowers the price
indices of manufactured goods in both regions. Yet, this change does not directly map
into a clear welfare assessment. Indeed, for a given value of λ, the impact of a lower
freight rate on aggregate consumer welfare is a priori unclear. This is because of the
interdependence between factor and product markets, even when the location of ﬁrms is
held ﬁxed. Indeed, a decrease in t has two opposing eﬀects: (i) it directly raises consumer
surplus via lower prices, but (ii) it also indirectly lowers consumer welfare by triggering
more competition on the products markets, thus leading ﬁrms to make lower operating
proﬁts and skilled workers to earn lower wages.
Some standard, but cumbersome, calculations show that ∂W/∂t<0 over the domain
t<t trade. In other words, for any given ﬁrm distribution, aggregate consumer welfare











which may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 For any given ﬁrm distribution, aggregate consumer welfare rises when
the number of carriers increases, even though skilled wages decrease.
This result is in accordance with what transport analysts and policy-makers expect:
transport deregulation makes consumers better oﬀ. However, they often omit to recognize
that such a conclusion might not be robust in a world where agents’ have incentives to
relocate because of lower freight rates. This aspect has been repeatedly emphasized in
economic geography and is the focus of the next section.
205.2 Endogenous industry distribution
In what follows, we focus mainly on interior equilibria λ
∗ ∈ (1/2,1). Indeed, in the case of
corner solutions (agglomeration or dispersion), the spatial distribution of ﬁr m sd o e sn o t
change due to marginal changes in m. In that case, everything works as in the foregoing.
In addition, neither full agglomeration nor dispersion seem to adequately describe the
space-economy in the real world.
5.2.1 Commodities prices
When the location of ﬁrms and skilled workers may change due to a fall in freight rates,
our previous results no longer hold because both the slope and the intercept of the demand
function (11) vary with λ. In particular, as shown in Appendix A.3, price indexes vary







Observe that a marginal increase in m favors: (i) a fall in freight rates which, all else
equal, reduces the prices of varieties consumed in both regions, as previously; and (ii)
relocation of ﬁrms towards the large region. This gives rise to two opposite eﬀects. On
the one hand, for given freight rates, product prices decrease in the large region at the
expense of the small one. On the other hand, more agglomeration implies higher freight
rates (∂t∗/∂λ
∗ > 0), as shown in Section 3, thereby raising product prices in both regions.









In words, prices fall in the agglomerating region, whereas they rise in the region that loses
ﬁrms despite the more competitive transport sector. Our results may be summarized as
follows.
Proposition 4 When there is partial agglomeration, transport deregulation reduces prices
in the large region but raises them in the small one.
Hence, once we take into account the equilibrium relationship between agglomeration
and freight rates, an increase in competition among carriers maps into lower consumer
prices in the large region and higher consumer prices in the small one. Such a result
suggests that the impact of transport deregulation could well be welfare-worsening, at
least in one of the regions. This point is the focus of the next section.
215.2.2 Aggregate consumer welfare
In the same model as this one but in which the freight rate is exogenously given, Ottaviano
and Thisse (2002) show that aggregate consumer welfare evaluated at the market prices





8bφ(3bφ +2 cL + cA)+3 c2L(A + L)
whereas t<t o implies that agglomeration is welfare-maximizing. By contrast, the spa-
tial equilibrium shifts from dispersion to agglomeration once the competitive freight rate
t∗(∞)=τ falls below ε2/ε1, which is strictly larger than to (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2002).
In other words, the market outcome may be ineﬃcient in the sense that there is too much
agglomeration. Because transport deregulation favors agglomeration, such a policy may
aﬀect welfare negatively by amplifying the unequal spatial distribution of ﬁrms.
The novelty here is that partial agglomeration may be an equilibrium. Therefore,
it is worth asking how the aggregate consumer welfare changes with λ.W e s h o w i n
Appendix A.5 that more agglomeration is welfare-decreasing. This result suggests that
increasing the number of carriers could be welfare-worsening as the entry of new carriers
leads both to more agglomeration and lower wages.






























in which two additional terms appear when compared with (22). The ﬁrst one captures
the indirect eﬀect that an increase in m has on the equilibrium freight rate, which impacts
itself on the spatial equilibrium. Given what we have seen in the previous section, the signs
are as indicated in (23) so that this term is always negative. The second term accounts
for the direct impact that an increase of m has on the spatial equilibrium. Again, this
term is negative.
Although the sign of (23) is a priori ambiguous, due to positive short-run gains and




Hence, once it is recognized that ﬁrms and workers may change location in response to
long run changes in competition between carriers, more competition in the transport sector
can make consumers worse oﬀ because of excessive agglomeration. We may thus conclude
as follows.
22Proposition 5 (harmful deregulation) When there is partial agglomeration, trans-
port deregulation leads to a lower aggregate consumer welfare.
Thus, contrary to a general belief, deregulating a competitive transport sector at the
interregional level is detrimental to consumers when changing this sector’s market struc-
ture induces a redistribution of activities across regions. The spatial eﬀects of transport
deregulation are at the heart of the explanation: a more competitive transport sector
induces more agglomeration which is, by itself, detrimental to welfare and, in addition,
raises freight rates, thereby reducing consumers’ surplus.
It is worth noting that introducing carriers’ ﬁxed costs strengthens the foregoing re-
sults when ﬁxed costs are incurred in terms of unskilled labor. Indeed, although the
location of skilled workers and the consumption of the diﬀerentiated good are not af-
fected, the consumption of the homogenous good decreases, thus reducing the welfare of
each consumer.19
5.2.3 Individual consumer welfare and spatial equity
Until now, we have focused only upon the impact of transport deregulation on aggre-
gate consumer welfare. Yet, assessing more ﬁnely the individual changes across consumer
groups is important because “regardless of economists’ explanations, the public is very
sensitive to perceived changes in interpersonal equity” (Winston, 1993, p.1276). In our
model, individuals living in diﬀerent regions are aﬀected diﬀerently by transport deregu-
lation and experience diﬀerent eﬀe c t s .W eh a v es e e nt h a ti ti so n l yu n d e re x t r e m es p a t i a l
conﬁgurations (agglomeration or dispersion) that the welfare of a consumer increases
when transport is deregulated. This shows, a contrario, that such patterns of production
are needed to justify the implicit assumption that transport deregulation does not aﬀect
ﬁrms’ locations.
There are four types of consumers in our economy: skilled and unskilled workers, living
in either region H or region F. Because unskilled workers are geographically immobile,
and because their wage is ﬁxed, all welfare changes materialize solely through consumer






















19When ﬁxed costs are incurred in terms of skilled labor, the analysis is more involved. This is because
both the manufacturing and transport sector compete for skilled labor, while the entry of a new carrier
leads to a decrease in the total mass of varieties.
23Because d(S∗
H + S∗





Their wage does not vary with respect to their location, which implies that the unskilled
workers residing in the large region are better oﬀ, whereas those living in the small region
are worse oﬀ.





F holds due to location arbitrage at any partially agglomerated
equilibrium, the welfare of a skilled worker varies in the same direction regardless of her











Thus, every skilled worker is hurt by the entry of new carriers. To sum-up:
Proposition 6 When there is partial agglomeration, transport deregulation hurts all work-
ers except the immobile residing in the large region.
Two remarks are in order. First, because dS∗
H/dm − dS∗
F/dm > 0,a ta n yi n t e r i o r
spatial equilibrium it must be that dw∗
F/dm − dw∗
H/dm > 0. Stated diﬀerently, interre-
gional wage diﬀerentials are magniﬁed by the deregulation of the transport sector.S e c o n d ,
whereas the welfare gap between skilled remains equal to zero during the whole agglom-
eration process, things are diﬀerent regarding the unskilled. Any unskilled in the large
region is better oﬀ but any unskilled in the small region is worse oﬀ. Consequently, trans-
port deregulation exacerbates economic inequality between immobile unskilled workers,
thus aﬀecting negatively spatial equity.
5.3 Carriers’ proﬁts
Let us now turn to the impacts of deregulation on carriers’ proﬁts. Aggregate proﬁts in













When locations are ﬁxed, diﬀerentiating ΠT with respect to m is equal to ∂ΠT/∂m,
which is always negative. Thus, more competition in the transport sector is harmful to
the carriers in the short run as it decreases each carrier’s proﬁts. The same holds true
24when full agglomeration or dispersion prevails, since in this case the spatial distribution
of economic activity does not change with m. More interesting is the case of partial




























with ∂Q/∂λ R 0 if and only if t∗(m) R η. As expected, the direct eﬀect is negative.
However, the indirect eﬀect is positive when t∗(m) > η. Accordingly, the global impact
is a priori ambiguous. When more carriers operate, it could well be that they earn more
proﬁts. The reason is that, as shown before, the demand for transport services becomes
less elastic when agglomeration increases. Because a larger number of competitors leads
to more agglomeration, carriers increase their freight rates and markups, which in turn
may lead to higher proﬁts.





(ε1τ − ε2)2(ρ0 − ηρ1)(ε2 − ε1η)
ε1 [((m +1 ) ε2 − ε1(η + mτ))]
2 > 0
where the inequality is due to (C2) and (C4). Note that such an eﬀect does not suggest
itself, because the direct eﬀect is shown to be always negative. Nevertheless, as expected,




(ε2 − ε1τ)3(ρ0 − ηρ1)
ε1 [(m +1 ) ε2 − ε1(η + mτ)]
2 < 0
because of (C2) and (C4).
W em a yt h u sc o n c l u d ea sf o l l o w s .
Proposition 7 When there is partial agglomeration, transport deregulation raises global
proﬁts in the transport sector but reduces individual carriers’ proﬁts.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In modern market economies, freight rates are largely determined by the interactions be-
tween imperfectly competitive carriers and imperfectly competitive manufacturing ﬁrms.
25We have presented a model incorporating such an enriched market structure to show
that the welfare implications of transport deregulation crucially hinge upon the mobility
of ﬁrms and workers, as well as on changes in factor prices. Whereas deregulating trans-
port policies are unambiguously consumer welfare-enhancing in the short run, when the
spatial distribution of activity is taken as given, they are consumer welfare-worsening in
the long run when the spatial distribution of ﬁrms adjusts to those changes. Three main
reasons underlie this unsuspected result. First, as agglomeration increases, the elasticity
of demand for transport services decreases. This in turn confers more market power to
the carriers, despite the deregulation, which dampens the magnitude of price responses to
the initial policies. Consequently, deregulation of the transport sector makes that sector
as a whole more proﬁtable, at the expense of consumers. Second, as often emphasized
in the literature, deregulation and antitrust policies tend to focus predominantly on con-
sumer gains, neglecting too often possible losses on labor markets. We have shown that
transport deregulation exacerbates competition in the manufacturing sector, thereby re-
ducing prices but decreasing the wage bill. Last, it is often overlooked that the spatial
distribution of economic activity has, by itself, important implications for both welfare
and equity. Since the market outcome already yields usually too much agglomeration,
additional agglomeration due to transport deregulation clearly further reduces welfare.
One ﬁnal comment is in order. Indeed, one may wonder to what extent our results
are driven by our modelling strategy. In that respect, it is worth emphasizing that our
model is of the linear type and has, as such, been widely used in industrial organization,
imperfect competition, and competition policy (see, e.g., Vives, 1999; Motta, 2004). This
suggests that our results can hardly be dismissed out of hand on the grounds of modelling
choices only. It further suggests that our main results are still likely to hold in settings
that are not too nonlinear, thus implying that deregulation might well have more welfare
costs than usually claimed by transport analysts, policy makers, and antitrust authorities.
At the very least, our results show that transport deregulation aﬀects the distribution of
economic activity across regions and countries, a variable neglected so far in “good”
assessments of this policy.
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n2[4bφ + c(nφ + A)](b + cn)
2(2b + cn)
> 0 η ≡
4aφ
4bφ + c(nφ + A)
> 0
(A.2) Parameter deﬁnitions:
ΛA =( 4 ρ1 + ρ2)[(m +1 ) ε2 − mε1τ] − (4ρ0 + ρ2η)ε1
ΛB = −ρ2[ε1(mτ + η) − (m +1 ) ε2]







−(ε2 − ε1τ)(ρ0 − ηρ1)ε2n(b + cn)




where the inequality is due to (C2) and (C5).
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where the inequality is due to (C2), (C3) and (C5). Because prices in the two regions













n2(b + cn)t(2λ − 1)[Ac(8b +3 cn)t + ((24b2 +1 6 cnb +3 c2n2)t − 16a(3b + cn))φ]
8(2b + cn)2
the sign of which depends on the sign of
Ac(8b +3 cn)t +
£¡
24b
2 +1 6 cnb +3 c
2n
2¢
t − 16a(3b + cn)
¤
φ.
This expression is positive (resp., negative) if t>t o (resp., t<t o). Because to <t ∗(λ
∗)=
ε2/ε1,i tm u s tb et h a tdW/dλ < 0 at any partially agglomerated equilibrium.




ac2n3(b + cn)(5b +2 cn)ε2(ρ0 − ηρ1)(ε2 − ε1τ)φ(A + nφ)
2(2b + cn)2ε1ρ2[(m +1 ) ε2 − ε1(η + mτ)]2 < 0.
where the sign is due to (C2) and (C5).






(ρ0 − ηρ1)(ε2 − ε1τ)(b + cn)n3c2ε2
2







(ε2 − ε1τ)(ρ0 − ηρ1)ε2c2n2aφΛA(2n2cφ +5 bnφ +2 bA)(b + cn)
2ρ2ε1φ[m(ε2 − ε1τ)+ε2 − ε1η]2(2b + cn)2ΛA
< 0.
30Appendix B
Let K ≡ ρ0 + λ(1 − λ)ρ2η − [ρ1 + λ(1 − λ)ρ2τ] stand for the numerator of the markup.
Using the deﬁnitions of the coeﬃcients ρi and η, as given in Appendix A.1, it is readily
veriﬁed that K>0 if and only if
τ < τ(λ) ≡
a[A +4 Lλ(1 − λ)]
A[b + cnλ(1 − λ)] + L(4b + cn)λ(1 − λ)
which is strictly increasing in λ on [1/2,1]. Evaluating the threshold τ at λ =1 /2 then
yields the suﬃcient condition




for markups to be positive regardless of the industry distribution λ. Furthermore, im-
posing t∗(λ) <t trade as required by (C1) for interregional trade to occur regardless of the









(1 − λ)λρ2 + ρ1
¸
. (26)
Since the right-hand side of (26) is strictly decreasing in λ under (C2), a suﬃcient condition
for it to hold regardless of the spatial distribution of the industry is given by




Finally, one can check that τtrade(m) < τ(1/2) for all m ≥ 1. Hence, condition (C3)
is suﬃcient for (i) trade to occur and (ii) carriers’ equilibrium markups to be strictly






Figure 1. Demand for transport
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Figure 2. Spatial equilibria in (m,τ)-space
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